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ABSTRACT
The article presents a legal act as a potential subject of mythologization. The tools derived from 
the studies on political myth were used to describe a phenomenon that strictly belongs to the political 
and legal reality – the American JUST Act of 2017, which in recent years has caused many contro-
versies in Polish public debate. While using the theoretical methods of the most notable researchers 
of the political myth, such as R. Barthes or E. Cassirer, it has been shown that legal acts, as well 
as their reception and interpretation, are not always based on rational forms of cognition. They can 
also be affected by a political myth and a mythical form of cognition, which is depicted in this study 
by means of methodology implemented from the studies on political myth. The article formulates 
interesting comments that may be useful for a better understanding of the phenomena on the border 
of Polish jurisprudence, political science and mythology.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of myth (including the political myth which is especially inter-
esting for those who specialize in the history of political thought), is a subject that 
can be studied by scientist that come from many different disciplines and who can 





therefore present many different approaches: psychological, political, sociological, 
historical, or the one that reflects the position of literature or religious studies. While 
the topic of myth is mainly presented in the context of political or socio-cultural 
reality, one may struggle to find in today’s studies of myth an approach that presents 
the myth’s connections with the reality of law.
When one decides to undertake the scientific studies of political myth, a crucial 
problem determining the whole character of that scientific work is defining its sub-
ject. One must notice that the subject which is searched for in this case, consists of 
many different forms of myth’s manifestations or expressions of mythical content, 
throughout which mythically characterized signs can be read off. Myth, in the 
context of all the theories presented in this paper, is not understood as a tale about 
legendary heroic deeds. Rather than that, it is considered to be a way of thinking that 
leads to making sense of the reality that surrounds us. This way of understanding 
the myth corresponds with the attitude presented by the majority of well-known 
scientists who studied the subject. For example, M. Napiórkowski, who studies 
myths in today’s vernacular culture, notices that “the myth asks us about the sense, 
while it is a practice of imposing the meaning itself”.1 On the other hand, M. Eliade, 
a specialist in explaining myths from the perspective of the history of religion, was 
emphasizing that he is interested in the concept of the myth understood as a tool 
used to create patterns of behavior or to give the meaning and value to people’s 
existence.2 For R. Barthes, who was describing myths from the perspective of se-
miology, myths were “a form, a way of imposing a meaning”.3 There is no need to 
cite other attempts to define the concept of myth by different scientists who worked 
on this subject. Those that are quoted above are enough to justify a statement, that 
at least the character and the functions of myth are not controversial in modern 
studies of myth, regarding many different scientific perspectives.
Since a basic understanding of what the myth is seems to be non-controversial, 
it is necessary to address the consequence of a great importance (especially for those 
who study the history of political thought) that is created by this way of describing 
the myth. Because of the fact that the myth is considered to be a specific form of 
transmitting the mythical content one must ask where should we look for the means 
of this mythical transmission? In this case, the opinions of the scientists that were 
cited above are going to be slightly different. For example, M. Eliade would say 
that using the myth is an activity which is typical for primitive communities and 
that nowadays, even if the mythical way of thinking did not completely disappear, it 
is “reduced to the realm of second-tiered or even irresponsible social actions”.4 On 
1 M. Napiórkowski, Mitologia współczesna, Warszawa 2018, p. 10.
2 M. Eliade, Aspekty mitu, Warszawa 1998, p. 8.
3 R. Barthes, Mit i znak, Warszawa 1970, p. 25.
4 M. Eliade, Mity, sny, misteria, Warszawa 1999, p. 32.
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the other hand, E. Cassirer, a founder of the neo-Kantian theory of myth, would say 
the opposite – that the mythical way of thinking is a major factor even in modern 
political systems and that it is impossible to find any major culture in the history 
of mankind that would not be rich in mythical elements.5 Where then, in today’s 
world, can we find a source of knowledge about myths which function in modern 
reality? Is their role today limited only to interesting, but politically less important 
socio-cultural aspects, and as a consequence of that, is there a researcher who works 
in the area of political and legal thought limited in his attempts to find any mythical 
content in the instruments of political and legal reality?
MATERIALS AND METHOD
There is definitely some truth in the statement that the mythical way of thinking 
has never disappeared in modern societies. Obviously, these days a major role is 
played by rational and scientific cognition. However, this does not mean that the 
mythical way of thinking does not exist anymore, it only means that the propor-
tions in the use of different methods of cognition have changed while compared 
to the primitive communities. Modern mythologies, as M. Napiórkowski notices, 
“are born at the crossroads of an amazing complexity of the modern world and 
the individual cognition”.6 According to this author, this statement must lead to 
a conclusion that the place where expressions of the mythical content may appear 
is not only the popular culture and everyday life of modern societies, but also those 
products of human activity, which in the world of a very advanced specialization 
and complexity that surrounds us, cannot be understood by the majority of the 
people. Without any doubt, this group also includes the political and legal activity.
This article is an attempt to describe those means of mythical content’s trans-
mission that belong to the political and legal reality by using various theoretical 
tools, borrowed from the works of the theorists that were previously presented. 
The subject of the analysis are the elements of mythologization that occurred at the 
reception of the JUST Act of 2017 – a legal act that was passed by the United States 
Congress. Its political meaning shortly became very controversial in Polish public 
debate. According to the author, it happened precisely because of the extremely 
strong mythical content in the public discussion that arose around the legal act, 
which despite the common opinion is a phenomenon that can be interpreted not 
only by using the rational means of understanding.
5 E. Cassirer, Mit państwa, Warszawa 2006, pp. 13–14.
6 M. Napiórkowski, op. cit., p. 38.





WHAT IS THE JUST ACT OF 2017?
Despite the fact that the legal analysis of the JUST Act is not the main aim of 
this article, it is necessary for the following analysis to at least briefly discuss its 
general character. What in Polish debate is called ustawa 477 is in fact the Justice 
for Uncompensated Survivors Today Act of 2017 (or JUST Act of 2017).7 The Act 
is legislation signed on 9 May 2018, after being passed both in the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. The content of the Act is easily accessible through offi-
cial databases. Its little volume – about a page and a half – allows every potential 
reader to become easily informed about the source of the whole debate that was 
the result of the bill’s passing.8
The main and, in fact, the only aim of the legislation is to create an obligation 
for the Department of State to present a special one-time report to Congress.9 The 
deadline to present the report was set to be 18 months after the legislation became 
law. The report has to present to Congress the steps and actions that were taken 
by the states that signed the non-binding Terezin Declaration of 2009 to fulfill its 
provisions. One of the signatories of the declaration is also the Republic of Poland, 
which like other 46 countries declared to take steps to fulfill its provisions almost 
10 years before the JUST Act was passed.
The report’s concern is to describe how the provisions of the Terezin Declaration 
are fulfilled by its signatories, with special consideration of those provisions that 
are directly mentioned in the JUST Act. These are the laws and policies of covered 
countries that refer to: the return of (or restitution for if the return is not possible) 
of the wrongfully seized or transferred Holocaust era assets to its rightful owners,10 
including religious organizations; in case of heirless property – the compensation 
that is understood as supporting those Holocaust survivors who happened to be in 
tough financial situation, supporting Holocaust education and other purposes; the 
extent to which such laws and policies are practically enforced through administra-
tive and judicial processes; the extent to which the aims and goals of the declaration 
are practically enforced when it comes to claims of United States citizens Holocaust 
survivors or the claims of their families.
7 The name ustawa 447 which became the most popular description of the bill in Poland refers 
to the number that was assigned to the legislation during the proceedings in the Senate – 447.
8 Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act of 2017, www.congress.gov/115/
plaws/publ171/PLAW-115publ171.pdf [access: 27.01.2020].
9 According to the JUST Act the report should be presented to the foreign affairs and budget 
committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
10 According to the JUST Act the property that was wrongfully seized or transferred is the prop-
erty that was nationalized, confiscated, expropriated or was the object of forced sales or transfers and 
sales or transfers under duress during the Holocaust era or the period of Communist rule of a covered 
country.




Legal Act as the Subject of Mythologization: Remarks on the Reception… 171
It also has to be mentioned, that in the text of the Terezin Declaration, to which 
the JUST Act directly refers by deriving the matters that the Department of State 
must take into consideration while preparing the report, directly from declarations 
provisions, one can also find other aims and goals that its signatories declare to 
fulfill, which are not mentioned later in the JUST Act. These are aims and goals 
such as: activities on identifying and restoration of Jewish burial grounds and 
cemeteries or organizing official state events commemorating Holocaust victims 
and also introducing and emphasizing the topics of Holocaust and Nazi war crimes 
in public education.11
Another fact that is crucial for the discussed matters is that one of the goals 
of the Terezin Declaration was establishing the European Shoah Legacy Institute, 
which, in accordance with declarations provisions, published eight reports on ful-
filling the aims and goals of the declaration during the time of its activity which 
was between the years 2010–2017. As it was mentioned above, the reports covered 
an even broader range of states’ activities than should be the matter of interest of 
the Department of State according to the JUST Act.12 Regarding that, one can find 
the opinions and statements that appeared in the Polish public debate on the JUST 
Act even more interesting.
SEMIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDIES OF POLITICAL MYTH 
AND THE TERM “JEWISH CLAIMS”
One of the perspectives from which we can look at the mythical phenome-
non created in the Polish public debate on the JUST Act is the one proposed by 
R. Barthes. In this context, no one should be surprised by the use of methodology 
which was originally used by the author to analyze mythical content rather in the 
elements of cultural and social reality than in the legal and political one. Even 
Barthes noticed that the subject of interest of those who study the myth may be 
very broad, while noticing that the myth is not determined by the object of its 
transmission, but by the form in which this transmission is expressed and that the 
limitations of the myth are only formal and never substantial.13
Barthes was analyzing myths as products of the semiological system, which 
is understood as a pattern of giving meaning to different words. In this process, 
a relation between the three elements: signifier, signified and the sign is assumed 
11 See Terezin Declaration of 30 June 2009, https://wjro.org.il/cms/assets/uploads/2019/06/
terezin_declaration.pdf [access: 27.01.2020].
12 More information about the European Shoah Legacy Institute activities can be found on its 
website: www.shoahlegacy.org [access: 27.11.2019].
13 R. Barthes, op. cit., p. 25.





(Figure 1). The signifier becomes a form, or in other words way of transmitting the 
meaning for the signified that is imbued with content. Those two elements combined 
together create a sign that can be read by the recipient. But it is what happens in 
the next step of the pattern that is for Barthes a crucial stage of creating the myth. 
Another step is built over the one described above. That following step transforms 
what was a final sign in the first one into a new signifier of the second step. As 
a result, the meaning that was embodied in the final sign of the first step is acquired 
by the second one and becomes a form of transmission for the mythical content, 
which in the end can be read by the recipient as the mythical signs.14
Figure  1. The semiological scheme of R. Barthes
Source: own elaboration.
For Barthes, the most important result of this process in which myth is formed 
is an effect that he calls regression. It is a situation in which a sign that is the final 
product of the second stage of the system, despite being structurally connected with 
the meaning assigned at the first stage, does not carry that meaning anymore. In 
this case, as the author notices, “a myth captures a completed sense and changes 
it into an empty, parasitic form”. In this process “the sense loses all its meaning 
while still being alive and eaten by the mythical form”.15
How those briefly presented theoretical tools can be used to describe discussions 
concerning the JUST Act? Well, they may turn out to be extremely useful when it 
comes to analyzing the term “Jewish claims” which is widely used by those who 
take the floor in the debate on the JUST Act. As an example, the mentioned term 
can be found in the article published by a website Polonia Christiana under the title: 
„Stop 447”. Czy narodowcy obronią Polskę przed roszczeniami? (“Stop 447”: Will 
the nationalists defend Poland form the claims?) by M. Wałach.16 In this case, the 
14 Ibidem, pp. 29–34.
15 Ibidem, pp. 35–36.
16 M. Wałach, „Stop 447”. Czy narodowcy obronią Polskę przed roszczeniami?, 8.11.2019, 
www.pch24.pl/stop-447--czy-narodowcy-obronia-polske-przed-roszczeniami-,72041,i.html [access: 
27.01.2021].
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term “claim” functions as a mythical sign, a product of the second stage of the semi-
ological system. Furthermore, the author of the article allows the reader to directly 
watch the process of regression, as described by Barthes. At the beginning of the text, 
the (Jewish) claims17 appear in the context of heirless property. As a sign, the term is 
filled with a clear legal meaning that is understood as someone’s cause of dementing 
the return of some belongings (in this case it would be property) or execution of 
someone’s rights. Later the author of the article explains, and it is without any doubt 
a truthful explanation which is still set in the legal context, that “in the legal systems 
that are based on the Roman law, if any heirless property appears, it should be returned 
to the community – for example to the state from which its deceased owner came 
from”.18 But in the following part of the article, the discussed term is used to attribute 
a different meaning to it, under the guise of continuing a strictly legal discussion.
Jewish property became an inconvenient matter in Polish collective memory of the 
wartime Poland history of the years between 1939 and 1945. As A. Leder, an author 
of the book Prześniona rewolucja (Slept through Revolution) notices, the Holocaust 
crimes done by Nazi Germany resulted in derivative and often not expected possibility 
of social and economic advancement. That happened through claiming the empty 
socio-economical space which included property, land, means of production and 
companies that were all abandoned by Jews.19 As a result, that unsaid and inconvenient 
transition must have created a myth about Jewish groups of interest that constantly 
try to reclaim the “post-Jewish” property that now belongs to the Poles by using any 
possible means. This myth of course was not created as a brand new part of collective 
memory. It was based on many previous mythical stories about Jewish people that 
were creatively adapted to the new situation. It also emphasizes the mythical idea of 
eternal Polishness of the things that had to be defended from the “Jewish claims”. 
The more the people of Polish ethnicity are forced to defend “our Polish property” 
from the Jews, the more (regarding the logic of this mythical narrative) we have the 
historical, moral and even legal legitimacy to actually own it.
In the article by M. Wałach, one can then observe the use of mechanisms that 
allows the sign from the first stage to be filled with a brand new meaning, thanks to 
regression. “Claims” than at first function only as a legal term are later used in dif-
ferent contexts, which correspond with the mythical narrative about Polish-Jewish 
history that was explained above. Moreover, those contexts are going to be quite 
far from the rational, legal interpretation of the JUST Act and its consequences. 
The author of the article expects that passing the JUST Act as American law, which 
17 It is not always that the “Jewish” part of the term is directly expressed by its users. Despite 
that, almost every time when this term appears in the context of the debate on JUST Act, the Jewish 
nature of the “silent” claimant can be without any doubt derived from the context.
18 M. Wałach, op. cit.
19 A. Leder, Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej, Warszawa 2014, pp. 89–95.





only legal result would be a one-time report based on some of the provisions of 
a non-binding Terezin Declaration, may have “dangerous consequences”. He de-
scribes them as a risk of “distributing property to Jewish organizations” and that 
“compensating those claims” can only be done through “transferring valuable real 
estate into Jewish hands”. Here it can be seen how through regression legal instru-
ments of compensating one’s loss can become a mythical powerful tool in the hands 
of unknown Jewish organizations, which also uses some well-established antise-
mitic stereotypes that view the Jews as those who economically exploit the Poles.
In his article, M. Wałach refers to the publication by A. Stelmach, published 
on the same portal, entitled „JUST Act” i duch Bartoszewskiego. Co dalej z ży-
dowskimi roszczeniami? („JUST Act” and Bartoszewski’s spirit: What’s next for 
Jewish claims?). The headline was illustrated with a meaningful picture of a group 
of Hasidic Jews praying in front of the United States Congresses façade.20 It also 
ends with a conclusion that as a result of introducing the JUST Act “Jews are going 
to demand a compensation from the Republic of Poland that will be worth 300 
billion dollars”. The author not only does not explain any justification for those 
calculations, but also does not explain how possibly this consequence can be derived 
from the fact that a legal act such as the JUST Act became the law in the United 
States. She does not even elaborate on who would be the claimant in this case. 
No legal person or organization is mentioned, only a collective entity – the Jews.
Another example of transformed, mythical understanding of the term “Jewish 
claims” can be seen in the publicity of an Internet television the National Media 
(Pol. Media Narodowe). In the Internet broadcast entitled Roszczenia żydowskie. 
Antypolonizm Żydów w USA ma długą tradycję (Jewish claims: The anti-Polonism 
of Jews in the USA has a long tradition) the author proposes a religious explana-
tion for Jewish claims. There is no question of a desire to get rich, it is completely 
replaced by a religiously sanctioned anti-Polonism. The author explains (based on 
some other publications that are promoted in the National Media) that in the Tal-
mud, “the house of the gentile is seen as a barn for the animals”. He also says that 
“the American-Jewish propaganda” does not only refer to material claims based 
on civil law. It is believed by him, that the next steps are political and territorial 
claims, since in his opinion Jews even in the year 1918 “made attempts to diminish 
our borders” since they were reluctant to accepting Poland’s independence. The 
conclusion of his story is that, as he says “the history repeats itself” and that Jews 
once again are trying to do the same by enforcing the JUST Act.21 According to 
20 A. Stelmach, „JUST Act” i duch Bartoszewskiego. Co dalej z żydowskimi roszczeniami?, 
15.02.2019, www.pch24.pl/just-act-i-duch-bartoszewskiego--co-dalej-z-zydowskimi-roszczeniami-
-,59810,i.html [access: 27.01.2021].
21 See Roszczenia żydowskie. Antypolonizm żydów w USA ma długą tradycję, www.youtube.
com/watch?v=kGQRL3UfF6o [access: 1.12.2019].
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the semiological system presented before, legal forms of compensations that are 
in fact mentioned in the JUST Act are a sign of stage number one, that through the 
process of regression are turned into second stage’s sign known as “Jewish claims” 
that have little to do with their previous legal aspect.
A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE “STOP 447” INITIATIVE
Another possible use of the studies on political myth to describe the reception of 
the JUST Act in Poland is to look from this perspective at a project of a legislative 
initiative that was called “Stop 447”. A functional description of the phenomenon 
of myth, on which the following considerations are based, is contained in the 
concept of Swedish political philosopher E. Cassirer, whose remarks on political 
myth were included in his book The Myth of the State. Reference was also made 
to the achievements of the Polish researcher T. Biernat, who described his remarks 
extensively in the monograph Mit polityczny (The Political Myth).
It is very interesting to look at the “Stop 447” initiative from this perspective. 
The project of this legislative initiative was created as a result of the discussion 
about the impact of the JUST Act. It’s author is a nationalist NGO Roty Marszu 
Niepodległości. A legislative committee created by this organization started to col-
lect signatures under a project of this new law on 29 October 2018. The project’s 
main goal is to prohibit “any activities that may lead to acceptance of the claims 
concerning heirless property, including negotiations, settlements, recognitions of 
claims or plaints regarding heirless property, mediation or paying any financial or 
material compensations”. This project also proposes discontinuation of “all civil 
and administrative proceedings that may lead to settling of the claims that are 
in connection with any heirless property”. It also enforces a prohibition of any 
executive proceedings in those cases. Violation of the projected law’s provisions 
would result in serious penal consequences, in some cases even up to five years 
of imprisonment.22
From a dogmatic perspective, such a project can be considered surprising. Es-
pecially, if one has in mind the provisions included in the JUST Act and their lack 
of legal consequences for the Polish legal system (also regarding the non-binding 
nature of the Terezin Declaration). It seems that introducing such a law would be 
absolutely unnecessary since it does not change legal situation of the heirless prop-
erty at all. Lack of the need for new regulations in this area, including the penal 
regulations, are even more highlighted by the fact, that because of the currently 
binding regulations of the hereditary law as well as the procedures in reprivatisation 
22 Projekt ustawy „Stop 447”, https://stop447.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/OIU-STOP447-
projekt-ustawy-vo.pdf [access: 3.12.2019].





proceedings such as administrative, civil or executive proceedings will never hap-
pen in the first place.23 Why then introduce penal provisions relating to situations 
that will not take place in the current state of law? The answer to this question can 
be found in the reflections on functional aspects of the political myth, which is no 
unknown to the historians of political myth.
For T. Biernat, a place where one can search for the presence of myths are espe-
cially the myth’s expressions. The author understands them as an application of some 
preexisting mythical convention to particular elements of our culture. They can be not 
only the so-called direct expressions, i.e. political ideologies, but also their indirect 
forms, which are other cultural products. One could consider the “Stop 447” project 
to be one of those indirect myth’s expressions. The author also introduced a division 
between those myths that are created spontaneously (usually as an affectively motiv- 
ated reaction to situations that lack an understandable and easy logical explanation, as 
wars, natural disasters, economic crises, etc.) and those that are intentionally created.24 
An initiative like “Stop 447” would then belong to the second group, as a mythical 
tool used by the nationalist political groups. If one examined the “Stop 447” project 
using the functional typology proposed by Biernat, one would then notice that it can 
be seen as an indirect and intentionally created mythical expression. Understanding 
that, unveils the fact that the intention of a discussed project may not be the change 
of the law. Thanks to campaigning on this legislative initiative, the organizing com-
mittee was granted a massively important way of instilling the mythical content that 
the project bears, in those who may support it. Since what they proposed was said to 
have only a strictly legal meaning, including severe penal law changes, those who 
may be the recipients of their legislative campaign may consider it a radical reaction 
for then a really serious problem of “Jewish claims” that, thanks to the project, can 
be seen as a real risk for many Poles. It is without a doubt an example of using myth 
as a way of creating a meaning, which in this case is precisely the meaning that those 
who invented the project wanted to create.
Similar remarks on the concept of an intentionally created myth can be found 
in the writings of E. Cassirer, who noticed that:
The new myths do not arise as an outcome of a wild imagination. They are carefully crafted 
products, created by cunning and skillful specialists. […] since then myths can be produced in the 
same sense as one can produce any modern weapon such as a machine gun or a jet fighter.25
23 About the nature of reprivatisation proceedings, see Ł. Bernatowicz, Reprywatyzacja na przy-
kładzie gruntów warszawskich, Warszawa 2015; Reprywatyzacja w orzecznictwie sądów, ed. M. Pilch, 
Warszawa 2016; Postępowania reprywatyzacyjne, ed. K. Wiktor, Warszawa 2018; P. Kociubiński, Powo-
jenne przekształcenia własnościowe w świetle konstytucji, Warszawa 2013; P. Borecki, Reprywatyzacja 
nieruchomości na rzecz gmin wyznaniowych żydowskich, „Państwo i Prawo” 2011, no. 6, pp. 61–73.
24 T. Biernat, Mit polityczny, Warszawa 1989, pp. 111–163.
25 E. Cassirer, op. cit., p. 313.
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Cassirer also introduced a concept of the so-called magical word that focuses 
on the function of the mythical expressions. It has a very different character than 
a word in the sense of semantics. It is not used to describe the reality that surrounds 
us, but to create and change that reality to achieve certain goals and to generate 
certain emotions.26 It is also a concept that can be used to interpret the reason for 
which the “Stop 447” project was created. Introducing severe penal sanctions is not 
a way of adjusting the law to reality. On the contrary, it is a way of creating a new 
reality, which is adjusted to the rules of the myth on which the project is based. 
Moreover, thanks to this mechanism the myth that was the source of this whole 
process is then legitimized by the “Stop 447” project itself. The meaning and the 
role of the magical word, despite the concept being borrowed from a completely 
different approach to the studies of the myth, is surprisingly similar to the role 
played in this context by the process of regression described by R. Barthes.
CONCLUSIONS
The examples of using theoretical tools taken from the theory of political myth 
to describe political and legal processes definitely show that this approach leads 
to interesting conclusions. One can of course find many more of them than only 
those that were presented in this paper. They can make a great object of further 
scientific research. They also show that the problem of political myth is definitely 
an interdisciplinary one and that there is a lot that can be done in this area by the 
historians of political and legal thought. Since that, this article can only be treated 
as an invitation to look for the political myth in those areas that we all considered 
to be free from the irrationality of the myth.
The unsuspected accuracy of analyzing legal phenomenon from the mythical 
perspective points out the fact that often remains unnoticed – the legal reality is 
not free from mythical elements and the mythical way of thinking. In accordance 
with assumptions that were made above, the law is not different from any other 
product of our culture and, therefore, it is not free from the myth. This observation 
creates an obligation to always question the value of any new regulations. Legal 
disputes, as this paper presented, are not always purely rational. When our analysis 
of law lacks any doubt in its rationality, it may result in not noticing those legal 
changes that carry a mythical content that replaced the legal one. The approach 
to the legislative projects presented here will surely allow to question their flaws 
more effectively, at the same time defending us from nihilistic attitude of creating 
the law that has some hidden purposes, other than the legal changes.
26 Ibidem, pp. 313–314.






On 29 July 2020, almost half a year after this paper was written, the United 
States Department of State published the JUST Act Report. Since it is a document 
that covers the legal situation in 46 countries, its analysis would require a much 
more extensive description than this short supplement. From the perspective of the 
mythical fear of “Jewish claims” a part that refers to the legal status of the heirless 
property in Poland needs to be presented:
Poland has not passed a law to address the significant amount of private property left heirless 
by the Holocaust.  Instead, heirless property is governed by Polish inheritance law, which requires 
that such property be returned to the local municipality or national treasury.27
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W artykule ukazano akt prawny jako potencjalny przedmiot mitologizacji. Do opisu fenomenu 
należącego ściśle do rzeczywistości polityczno-prawnej – amerykańskiej ustawy JUST, która w pol-
skiej debacie publicznej wywołała w ostatnich latach liczne kontrowersje – użyto bowiem narzędzi 
wykorzystywanych w badaniach nad zjawiskiem mitu politycznego. Stosując osiągnięcia teoretyczne 
wybitnych badaczy mitu, takich jak R. Barthes czy E. Cassirer, wykazano, że akty prawne oraz ich 
recepcja i interpretacja nie zawsze opierają się na racjonalnych formach poznania. Może na nie wpły-
wać także mit polityczny i mityczna forma poznania, co przedstawiono w niniejszym opracowaniu 
za pomocą znanych badaniom nad mitem narzędzi teoretycznych. W artykule sformułowano intere-
sujące uwagi, które mogą być przydatne dla lepszego zrozumienia zjawisk z pogranicza polskiego 
prawoznawstwa, politologii i mitologii.
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